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Banking Records, Business and Networks in Colonial Sydney, 18171824

Abstract

This paper contributes to knowledge of early Australian colonial businesspeople and
their business activities through an examination of accounting transactions between
depositors in the first accounts ledger of the Bank of New South Wales. A social
network analysis framework is applied to the transactions to disclose business
networks and prominent individuals in the networks. The analysis seeks to ascertain
the importance of these people to commerce and the significance of their networks in
terms of facilitating commercial relationships in a business environment that was
fraught with uncertainty. The results illustrate the importance of networks to colonial
trade and mercantile activity, especially for smaller-scale businesspeople.

Keywords: networks, business networks, colonial business, uncertainty, Bank of New
South Wales, accounting, banking records, Australia
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Introduction
Sydney’s early colonial business and economic history is a story of remarkable
achievement in the face of many obstacles for would-be businesspeople. The early
colonial economy was formed from the need to feed, clothe and house the inhabitants and
was financed initially by the British government.1 Commerce was, thus, the sole means
by which private wealth could be accumulated. However, an unfamiliar environment
together with myriad sources of uncertainty — long distances from international markets
and lines of communication and credit, little ‘free’ labour, a small domestic market, a
shortage of currency and a government that did not initially encourage private enterprise
— meant that early businesspeople had to evolve new and adaptive business practices.2
How was this managed in a foreign land that was fraught with hazards, and where most
of the population was composed of convicts? Ville has described strategies used by
several pioneer firms to address these challenges, such as diversification and a focus on
capital minimising industries.3 However, a response was also needed that went beyond
the boundaries of the firm, particularly for smaller enterprises with few internal options.
In this context, inter-firm cooperation through networks would have helped firms
mitigate uncertainty. Networks are especially important in situations where it might be
costly to reverse potential risk effects of transactions. In contrast, a past successful
transaction exchange is likely to prompt repeat exchanges.4 This would have been
important in the colony. Thus, networks that improved sharing of information and

1

Phillips, Development under Macquarie, p. 32; N.G. Butlin, Forming a colonial economy, pp. 89-92.
White, Mastering risk, pp. 72-7; Ville, Business development, pp. 21-4. ‘Free’ labour means colonists
who were not convicts or ex-convicts (‘emancipists’).
3
Ville, Business development.
4
Rangan, The problem of search, pp. 824, 826.
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alleviated uncertainty would have assumed great consequence in the face of risky
business dealings.5
Regrettably, historians have neglected early nineteenth century enterprises,
despite their importance in initial Australian economic development. This neglect is due
partly to the paucity of extant business records.6 While several case studies have been
written, we know little of the way business was transacted between firms.7
Therefore, the aims of the study are first, to ascertain the extent of business
networks and their role in mitigating business uncertainty and facilitating commerce and
commercial relationships in the uncertain business environment. The second aim is to
broaden our knowledge of the businessmen and women in these networks whose
contribution to the early economic and business development of the colony of NSW may
have remained unrecognized.
Recorded accounting data from the first ledger and two minute books of the Bank
of New South Wales (hereafter, BNSW), Australia’s first formal bank, established in
1817, is used to identify possible colonial businesspeople.8 A social network analysis
framework is applied to the data to disclose networks and the prominent people in these
networks. Supplementary archival evidence, such as government correspondence,

5

Kadushin, The motivational foundation, p. 81.
Ville, Business development, p. 38; Steven, The changing pattern, p. 177.
7
For example, Hainsworth: The NSW shipping interest, Simeon Lord, Builders and adventurers, Trade
within, The Sydney traders; Steven: Merchant Campbell, Enterprise, The changing pattern, Public credit,
Eastern trade.
8
Held by Westpac Banking Corporation as BNSW First Ledger and Directors’ Minute Books 1 and 2. The
merger of the Bank of New South Wales and the Commercial Bank of Australia in 1982 created Westpac
Banking Corporation (Fleming, Merrett, and Ville, Big End, p. 120). S. J. Butlin (Foundations, pp. 138-9)
contended that although initially the operations of the BNSW were only on a small scale, the bank’s real
significance lay in the fact that the colony had developed economically to the point where it could support a
banking institution. It also symbolised the acceptance of economic development (p. 7).
6
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colonial newspapers, census reports and family letters and memoranda, provide detail on
the individuals identified and their backgrounds and occupations.
The specific time frame for the study, 1817-1824, is chosen because it was the
period covered by the ledger and minute books. The BNSW did not preserve its second
ledger, so there are no sources covering accounts data for ensuing years. The records
provide a complete set of transactions (deposits and withdrawals) for depositors of the
bank for the period of the first deposits accounts ledger, 8 April 1817 to 30 June 1820,
and transcripts of all shareholders’ and board of directors’ meetings from the bank’s
inception to 21 September 1824.9 The deposit accounts in the bank ledger represent
quantitative information regarding actual transactions—detailed, tangible data and
observable information not easy to find from this period. Network analysis techniques in
the form of network matrices can be applied to the BNSW data to analyse the extent of
relationships between depositors and to allow identification of possible business
networks.
The entries in the BNSW account books were not the only means of completing
business transactions in the colony. There were also a variety of coinage, discounted
British Treasury bills, and store receipts. We cannot say with certainty what proportion of
transactions were completed through the BNSW ledgers but reputable contemporary
observers point to their importance. Commissioner Bigge, in his report on agriculture
and trade in the colony in 1823 considered that “the notes of the Bank of New South

9

The first official record of the BNSW is a meeting held on 22 November 1816 regarding the establishment
of the bank (Directors’ Minute Book 1). Minute Book 1 covers the period 22 November 1816 to 21 July
1819; Minute Book 2 covers the period 27 July 1819 to 21 September 1824.
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Wales have constituted the largest portion of the circulating medium of the colony”, a
view reaffirmed by William Charles Wentworth.10
Thus, the BNSW records provide a unique opportunity to study networks that
might have existed at the time, and enable the development of a clear financial profile of
the people who used the bank. The bank records are invaluable for this particular type of
analysis because the free and freed population was small and the BNSW was the only
formal bank.
The bank data, in particular the bank ledger, have not been used for this specific
purpose. However, the value of these early financial records has been recognised by some
historians. The bank records have been examined for evidence of female participation in
commerce, and for whether networks existed among emancipists.11 Dense and cohesive
networks were found among emancipists; this would have been expected given that all
shared the same constraints and the convict ‘taint’. Trust, shared bonds and social
networks would have been expected and these networks were likely to promote sharing
and maintaining of information and resources. The present study provides a wider
perspective on colonial business and focuses on transactions between depositors across
all facets of colonial commercial society – emancipists, professional and India merchants,
farmers and public servants who also engaged in commerce, and traders, who were
regarded as less respectable than merchants. The results here are thus representative of all
colonial businesspeople and could suggest findings of more open networks where
searching and obtaining resources and accessing and extending bridges in a network (thus

10

(Bigge, Report, pp. 65-66) (Statistical, Historical, p. 9); Wentworth, Statistical Historical, p. 9.
Johns, The first female shareholders, Craig and Johns, Women in colonial commerce, Johns and van der
Eng, Networks and business development: convict businesspeople.
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increasing access to information) might be more useful.12 There would be less likelihood
of finding natural bonds and trust.
The next section describes the nature of commerce in early nineteenth-century
Sydney. This is followed by a description of the research methodology. Results and
discussion follow. Limitations of the study and areas for further research are addressed in
the final section.

The Colonial Business Environment
The British government wanted the colony to be self-supporting yet remain a gaol.
Moreover, its choice of governors provided little support for private enterprise until
Macquarie arrived (1809-21). He recognized the necessity for strong commercial groups
and the importance of emancipist entrepreneurial efforts, which caused friction with some
free merchants and officials and free immigrants, who regarded themselves as a social
and economic elite. However, economic difficulties plagued Macquarie’s administration.
There were two depressions in rapid succession, in 1812-13 and 1814, a prolonged
drought in 1815, and the flow-on effect of the 1810-1812 financial collapse in Britain.
There had also been a glut in shipments from India in 1811 and 1812 making cargoes
impossible to sell. India merchants, under pressure from their British interests to pay
outstanding debts, in turn called on colonial debtors to settle their accounts, and refused
to underwrite additional transactions.13 Many Sydney merchants were thus ruined for a
period and part-time merchants and traders withdrew from commerce to concentrate on

12
13

Lin, Social capital, p. 27.
Steven, The changing pattern, pp. 178-80; Linge, Industrial Awakening, p. 27.
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farming and pastoral interests.14 By 1815 Sydney’s commerce had almost totally
collapsed, and although trade improved between 1816 and 1821, the large profits made in
earlier years would not be repeated. Competition was acute and profit margins were
lower.
Therefore, a major issue for successful trading in the colony was the ability to
command capital and to be credit-worthy. This was difficult when markets and contacts
were so far away, and for ex-convicts, when reputation and good character were essential.
The India merchants who arrived after 1800 had sources of capital and connections
overseas and showed that the right contacts and the networks that sustained them were
crucial for enterprising businessmen. With the advent of these professional merchants,
and under Macquarie’s governorship, trade became a specialized, acceptable occupation
and emancipist traders began to emerge.15
Lack of currency, particularly coin, added to the problems. The colony lived on
credit. Colonial ‘money’ consisted of Commissariat (store) receipts, Treasury bills, bills
of exchange and promissory notes.16 Successive governors had difficulty controlling
currency because there were so many different forms and such a complexity of private
arrangements carried out through mercantile firms.17 There was no standard exchange
rate. Sources of coins included dollars, copper coins and ‘dumps’ that were cut from
larger coins. This disorganised currency system was Macquarie’s main reason for

14

Farmers and townspeople joined in mercantile pursuits, while merchants also owned farms. Mercantile
trading could avoid some of the problems associated with uncertainty because it could be conducted on a
smaller scale and was less dependent on capital and skilled labour (Ville, Business development, pp. 18,
38).
15
Steven, The changing pattern, pp. 176-77.
16
Booker & Craig, Balancing debt, p. 2.
17
S.J. Butlin, Foundations, pp. 5, 97-8; Steven, Public credit, p. 55.
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wanting to establish the BNSW; he believed it would help solve the problem of trying to
regulate private note issues.18
Sydney merchants had to plan ahead and monitor the local market closely, so that
they could fill predicted gaps in supply. The distance from suppliers meant that
merchants had to accurately predict future shipments, especially given that the small
Sydney market was exposed to the full force of natural fluctuations in supply.19
Information transfer was also very slow because it occurred at a rate dictated by the
physical movement of people or commodities.20 In addition, uncertainty regarding the
nature of the relationship between emancipists and settlers added to the economic
uncertainty they all faced.
Thus, imperfect information was a major impediment for successful business, and
diversification (which helped ease the problems of a small market), networking, and
vertical integration (which helped solve the low-trust problem) were used to combat risk
and an environment of distrust.21 For small and part-time entrepreneurs, networking was
a particularly attractive option to mitigate uncertainty.
In summary, problems caused by the lack of currency, distance from main
markets, labour shortages, communication problems, a small domestic market, the lack of
capital and credit backing, and for some, the added disadvantage of being an emancipist,
resulted in a volatile nature of business, so that only determined and courageous
businesspeople survived. Most of their decisions had to be made with imperfect
information; they had to be ‘judgemental decision-makers’ about the coordination of
18

Commissioner Bigge considered that the BNSW had ‘greatly added to the facility of commercial
transactions within the colony’. (Bigge, Report, pp. 65-66).
19
White, Mastering risk, p. 47.
20
White, Mastering risk, p. 74.
21
Ville, Business development, pp. 18, 38.

9

scarce resources.22 Business networks helped to address many of these sources of
uncertainty. By facilitating high trust rich transactions they lowered the costs of trading
and facilitated the sharing of information on distant and volatile markets, and the
extension of credit and acceptance of various forms of payment.

Research Method
Social Network Analysis and Social Capital
Sociologists use network analysis as a methodological framework or strategy to analyse
social structure and give a perspective on social behaviour.23 The emphasis is on
relationships.24 Network analysis is used in other disciplines, for example, to study
electrical circuits in physics, networks of roads and canals in geography, and interlocking
directorates.25 Clearly relations that form a network can be very diverse and they can also
include strictly business transactions.26
Lee claims that network analysis has several benefits. Social structure can be
revealed without requiring subjective insights to individual beliefs, values and normative
commitments. Ties or contacts are channels for communication or resource transmission,
so the greater the number of ties associated with an individual, the greater is that person’s
potential to communicate, influence or transfer resources to others in a network. And
specific features of network relationships can be investigated and the causal actions that

22

Casson, The entrepreneur, p. 22-5.
Marsden and Lin, Social Structure.
24
Morgan, Researching the transfer.
25
These include Fennema and Schijf, Analysing interlocking; Burt, Firms, directors and time; Berkowitz
and Fitzgerald, Corporate control; and Benediktsson, The deviant.
26
Flap, Conflict, loyalty, p. 2.
23
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have produced ‘the actual unique histories’ can be identified.27 This last aspect of
network analysis is most useful in this study.
Network analysis techniques offer an ideal framework to ascertain the pattern of
business relationships among depositors in the BNSW’s first deposit accounts ledger. The
network model used here is based on a transactions network, rather than a social network.
The BNSW deposit accounts identify by name those to whom payments were made from
the deposit accounts, and are therefore relational data because the relational aspects of
the data can be investigated. Transactions (payments) between BNSW depositors can be
analysed and the extent of possible business relationships established. Individuals with
the greatest number of contacts (transactions) can be identified as the potentially most
influential or powerful people in the network.28 The fact that a transaction has occurred
implies that there was a relationship between two people that initiated it – and thus, the
transaction can be viewed as a potential source of communication. Social network
analysis thus renders the depositor data more useful.
Data Selection
There were 158 deposit accounts in the BNSW ledger; four partnership accounts, four
charity or philanthropic fund accounts, one ‘police fund’ account that functioned as a
type of consolidated revenue fund, and 149 individual accounts. Balancing of the ledger
was undertaken every six months, and balance sheets and lists of depositors and
shareholders and their balances were produced from this process. From these it was
possible to identify whether depositors were also shareholders.

27
28

Lee, A social network, p. 8; Emirbayer and Goodwin, Network analysis, p. 1419.
Lee, A social network; Wasserman and Faust, Social network analysis.
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The first objective was to separate depositors who had large, frequent transactions
from those who had smaller, less frequent transactions, in order to isolate possible
smaller-scale from larger-scale businesspeople. A detailed analysis of transactions in each
depositor’s account was made. The purpose was to ascertain how often the account was
used, how long it had been held, and how large the transactions were. From this analysis,
it was possible to calculate, for each depositor, the average number of transactions per
week, and the percentage of transactions over £50.29 Depositors were segregated into
first, second or third tiers, according to the following criteria.
For inclusion in the first tier:
•

accounts averaged one or more transactions per week; and

•

more than 20 per cent of total individual transactions were over £50.

For inclusion in the second tier:
•

accounts averaged one transaction a month; and

•

more than five per cent of total individual transactions were over £50.
The frequency of contact criterion was important to establish the strength of a

link: above-average frequency characterises strong links and below-average frequency
characterises weak ones.30
Additionally, for both tiers, depositors must have used their account for more than
26 weeks (six months), during the period of the first ledger. This was to distinguish
longer-term depositors from those who spent only a brief period in the colony (for
example, ship’s captains) or part-time businesspeople who opened and closed accounts in
29

£50 has been used as the minimum criterion for large transactions because it was a considerable sum of
money. For example, the first accountant appointed by the BNSW (Robert Campbell Junior) was paid an
annual salary of £150 (Directors’ Minute Book 1), and the annual salary of a clerk employed in the East
India company in 1815 was £66 (Boot, Real incomes, p. 643).
30
Degenne and Forsé, Introducing social networks, p. 123.
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a short space of time. Many depositors kept their accounts for only short periods: for
example, T. Dunn for three weeks and S. Davis for sixteen weeks.
The record of depositors at 30 December 1821 from the Bigge Appendix,31 was
used to justify inclusion of depositors who did not open their account until the last weeks
of the first ledger. If they continued to use their accounts into the second ledger, they
could have had more influence on the development of the colonial economy than
depositors in the early period of the first ledger.
Depositors who did not meet either the first or the second tier criteria were
classified as third tier. These were very small-scale businesspeople or depositors who
used their accounts infrequently or only processed small payments (for example, less than
£1).32 Most depositors (90) fell into this category. These accounts were eliminated from
the network analysis because their small infrequent transactions negated meaningful
assessment of network activity.33 In addition, the four charity funds and police fund were
eliminated from the analysis as irrelevant to the networks. Also eliminated were eight
depositors with the same surname, because of the difficulty in ascertaining payments to
each other, given that the data were directed data. An exception was Robert Campbell
Junior and bank president John Thomas Campbell; the latter’s name was generally
entered as ‘his honour’ or ‘the president’ so could be differentiated. Mary Reibey and her
son George were also included because they made no payments to each other. Therefore,
of the 158 depositors, 36 were in the first tier of large-scale depositors, nineteen in the
second tier of smaller-scale depositors and 103 (including the charity and association
31

Bonwick Transcripts, Box 27, pp. 6294-98, Mitchell Library (ML).
After May 1818 the bank decided that no cheques for less than £5 would be written unless they were for
balances of accounts (Holder, Bank of New South Wales).
33
Knoke, Organisational networks, p. 22. Note that this could have meant these depositors did not use their
deposit accounts to process business transactions.
32
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accounts and the police fund and the eight accounts above) in the third tier. Table 1 lists
first and second tier depositors and, as far as can be determined, their occupations.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The Network Matrices
For social network analysis collected data is usually stored in a data matrix similar to a
table. In this study, MS-Excel was used to record and store the data. Five matrices were
derived from the depositor analysis. The first matrix was the depositors’ ‘affiliation-byaffiliation’ matrix, showing whether particular pairs of affiliations were linked through
common agents, for example, whether being a free person was linked to also being a bank
shareholder, or whether being an emancipist was linked to not being a shareholder.
Understanding the social structure of the networks analysed helps in interpreting results.
The outcome from the affiliation matrix was that free settlers were by far most
dominant in the BNSW; for example, more than twice the number of free depositors, (70
per cent), than emancipists (30 per cent), were also bank shareholders.34 Given this
finding, it was expected that the network results would be dominated by free persons,
rather than emancipists, regardless of which tier they were in.
The remaining four matrices were ‘case-by-case’ matrices of depositors. The first
two square matrices analysed ties among first tier depositors and among second tier
depositors. The third and fourth rectangular matrices analysed ties between first and
second tier depositors.

34

Given that the BNSW was founded after a meeting of “magistrates, principal merchants and gentlemen of
Sydney” held on 22 November 1816, this is not surprising; only one of these men was an emancipist
(Simeon Lord), who was a well-established successful merchant by this time (Holder, Bank of New South
Wales, p. 11).
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Data in all four matrices were both directed and valued, showing the direction and
number of payments between pairs of depositors. Directed data allow identification of the
most important person in the network, who is the person to whom most transactions are
directed.35 Valued data (here describing the number of transactions between pairs of
depositors), give an indication of the strength and potential influence of a relationship.36
With the square matrices the aim was to find whether there was a relationship
among depositors in the same tier and how strong it was (that is, how many transactions
passed between tier members). For the rectangular matrices, the aim was to ascertain how
many transactions were directed to those in the first tier from second tier depositors, and
vice versa.
Centrality measures, which reveal the most important person in the network, were
also calculated for each network from the matrices.37 Centralisation varies according to
the definition adopted to measure individual centrality. Here it was used as a measure of
transaction activity. Centrality was measured as each depositor’s proportion of total
transactions in the network and the person who received the most payments was central
to the network. This is what is known as ‘in-degree’ (choices received) centrality;
directed data also allow ‘out-degree’ (choices made) centrality, so that identification of
the individual both receiving and sending the most payments could be made.38 There is
not necessarily a positive correlation between people who direct the most transactions
(out-degree centrality) and those who receive the most transactions (in-degree centrality).

35

Undirected and unvalued data merely show that there is a relationship between two people or subjects;
such networks use binary data: 1 there is a relationship, 0 there is not, and give no indication of the strength
of the relationship.
36
Scott, Social network analysis, p. 49; Degenne and Forsé, Introducing social networks.
37
Degenne and Forsé, Introducing social networks, pp. 132-3.
38
Zemljič and Hlebec, Reliability of measures, p. 75.
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The former might be the member controlling the network or the member with the most
information in the network.
Thus, centrality was a relative measure, and allowed for comparisons of centrality
between networks.39
Supplementary archival sources, noted earlier, were used to trace the background
and business activity, where possible, of the individuals identified as likely
businesspeople.

Results and Discussion
First Tier
Network analysis results for the first tier matrix are shown in Table 2. Centrality
measures are presented in order of importance to the network:

TABLE 2 HERE

Table 2 shows that the most important depositor in the first tier was Williams,
followed by Campbell Junior and the merchant firm of Jones & Riley. These depositors
received the largest number of payments: Williams (174, centrality 12.7 per cent),
Campbell Junior (126, centrality 9.2 per cent) and Jones & Riley (90, centrality 6.6 per
cent). The centrality results for these depositors were well above the mean centrality of
2.8 per cent.
39

Local centrality measures were considered sufficient for the small data set. Several software packages
enable large amounts of data to be analysed (for example UCInet and statnet) and allow calculation of more
refined global measures of centrality like closeness and betweenness; however, these measures are based on
binary data using samples from larger populations, unlike this study. Lee (A social network analysis) found
betweenness and closeness were identical to the centrality measure he calculated. Zemljiĉ and Hlebec
(Reliability of measures, p. 82) also claim that in-and-out-degree are the most stable centrality measures.
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The total number of transactions in this network was 1,366. The mean number of
transactions per depositor was 37.9, with median and mode being 32 and 13.5
respectively. Those depositors who received more than 37.9 (or 38) transactions were the
first thirteen depositors in Table 2 – from Williams down to Levey. This means that 36
per cent of depositors in Tier 1 had more active accounts than the rest of Tier 1, which
could indicate they were involved in business activity.
The fact that Williams dominates the network analysis over Campbell Junior is
initially surprising in that Campbell Junior is well documented as a leading colonial
businessman, whereas Williams is relatively unknown.40 Almost 71 per cent of first tier
depositors made payments to Campbell Junior, as opposed to 63 per cent for Williams.
The total number of payments caused Williams’ superiority – 174 for Williams, 126 for
Campbell Junior. Nevertheless, Campbell Junior was connected to 71 per cent of the first
tier depositors, as opposed to Williams who was connected to only 63 per cent of that
group.
The highest number of common ties or links was between Campbell Junior and
Jenkins (80). In fact Campbell Junior’s centrality would not have been so high had it not
been for the 52 payments he received from Jenkins. There were also strong mutual ties
between Williams and Campbell Junior (77); Williams’ centrality would have been much
lower without the 65 payments he received from Campbell Junior. So, when the network
is examined closely, Campbell Junior dominated, even though his centrality measure was
40

Robert Campbell Junior was the nephew of Robert Campbell, ‘the father of Australian commerce’
(Steven, Merchant Campbell). Williams is much less well known and receives scant attention in the extant
literature. He came free in 1811, described as a ‘merchant’. In 1815 he established a retail shop with the
financial support of William Broughton (commissary and magistrate) and the governor’s secretary, J. T.
Campbell, who was his patron (Colonial Secretary’s Papers, Reel 6045, 4/1733, pp. 149-50, 24 June 1815,
National Library of Australia, NLA). Williams did not exchange payments with Broughton or Campbell,
despite their patronage.

17

much lower than Williams’. This is one of the benefits of directed ties in network
analysis, in that the detail of transaction behaviour, and thus the strength of the
relationship, is visible. Centrality of itself does not necessarily signify prestige or
importance in this network analysis; it is clear that Campbell Junior is responsible for
Williams’ high centrality. On the other hand, Jenkins’ 52 payments significantly increase
Campbell Junior’s centrality.
There was also considerable transaction activity in both directions between
Williams and Eagar (merchant and lawyer) (32 transactions) and between Jones and
Riley and Campbell Junior (33 transactions). Figure 1 expresses these relationships
graphically; it shows a five node network where the ten dyads or pairs are all connected
to each other. Nodes represent actors – in this case, depositors – while a set of lines
represent a direct tie between a pair (dyad).41

FIGURE 1 HERE
Williams, Campbell Junior, Eagar, Jones & Riley and Jenkins (all businessmen)
have a cohesive, high-density network, with no structural holes.42 This means that
information would more likely be shared among them, in which case Williams would
have less power (less control over information), but the network could benefit overall
because it could promote mutual trust and willingness to cooperate, and may engender a
sense of community among network members.43 Williams could have used his
41

Yang and Knoke, Optimal connections, p. 286.
Structural holes (the absence of ties within networks) potentially increase one’s social capital because
they increase non-redundant contacts. Burt (Structural holes) claims that individuals in the same network
who have no ties to each other have an advantage in that they might be bridges to other networks, and are
thus likely to link several small groups (Granovetter, The strength of weak ties) and add to information in a
network.
43
Flap and Völker, Goal specific, pp. 300-1; Kadushin, The motivational foundation, p. 77.
42
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relationship to one partner in the network to contact another partner in the network,
thereby forfeiting control of the content and timing of delivery of his information to
everyone else.44 Social capital would be a possible outcome of this network. However,
some authors claim that in competitive situations (such as in the NSW colony) cohesion
is a disadvantage because network members all have the same information and each is
constrained by the other, but at the same time, one cannot be played off against the
other.45 Thus, no one can gain advantage. On the other hand, structural holes in a network
can mean that individuals gain information from diverse clusters that do not have direct
access to one another, and one person can be played off against the other.
Nevertheless, lack of choice of business partners was a problem in the colony and
knowing who to trust assumed great importance. Rangan argues that in this situation,
economic actors turn to their networks, which assume real significance in influencing the
efficiency of economic actions and outcomes.46 Kadushin suggests that perhaps the most
interesting form of trust occurs when it is placed not in the partner to a dyadic transaction,
but in the system as a whole and when there is a significant time delay.47 Partners in a
network might have to exercise this form of trust when entering into exchanges where the
outcome is uncertain (as was likely or common in the colony).
Note that Eagar was the only emancipist, so the expected finding that free
depositors would dominate results has eventuated in this network analysis, although
Eagar’s centrality measure is among the top thirteen.
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What seems clear from their low centrality measures is that not all first tier
depositors were regularly involved in business activity. Some were government
employees, for example, UK government commissioner Bigge, Governor Macquarie’s
secretary J.T. Campbell, crown solicitor Garling, and explorer Oxley, and used their
personal accounts to process government transactions. There might have been a
professional network, as Laidlaw’s study into colonial governance found, among public
servants.48
For other depositors who had very low centrality measures, indicating little
network activity, a case might be made that they were part of other networks, for example
a third tier network of small-scale shopkeepers and artisans. They might also have been
paying servants or other employees.
Second Tier Network
Centrality measures for the second tier matrix are shown in Table 3, in descending order
of importance:

TABLE 3 HERE

The second tier matrix is smaller than the first tier with a total of only 73
transactions (as opposed to 1,366 transactions for the first tier). The spread of payments
was thus much lighter in this network. The first nine depositors (47 per cent) in Table 3
all received more than the mean payments per depositor of 3.8 and the mean centrality of
5.26 per cent. Robinson and Smith, Barnard and Wood, and Black and Willmot were the
most central depositors.
48
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Robinson, who was a public servant and poet, and Smith, who was a builder, are
highly connected to each other. Their high centrality only arises because of their mutual
transaction activity. It is possible that Robinson was making payments from his personal
account to Smith for government work.
Little is known of Barnard and Wood other than that they were a shipowner and
farmer, respectively. Black was the stepson of Simeon Lord, one of the colony’s first
networking entrepreneurs, and was employed by Lord in his hat manufacturing business.
Willmot was a publican.
The interesting feature of the second tier network analysis is that nearly half the
depositors show very little transaction activity, despite many of them being involved in
business activity. Bostock & McQueen was a merchant firm; Chippendall was a publican;
and Kitchen was a builder who worked on many government buildings. George Reibey
was the son of Mary Reibey, Australia’s first female entrepreneur, and looked after her
business interests while she was in England in 1820-21.49 This illustrates one of the
limitations of the study, in that not all depositors used the BNSW for their business
transactions. The importance of Amos in the network is perhaps misleading and an
indication of how careful one has to be in interpreting network results. Amos was a
practising lawyer and was possibly receiving payments for legal services performed.
There is no archival evidence to suggest that he was involved in commerce. Some
depositors, such as George Barnard and John Wood, received payments but made none,

49

Irvine, Mary Reibey.
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indicating that they had something some other depositors wanted, and which perhaps only
they could supply.50
First Tier/Second Tier Network Analyses
Centrality measures for first tier/second tier network analyses are presented in Table 4, in
order of importance to the network. The purpose is to show how important relationships
between those depositors in the two tiers were to each other, that is, between (possible)
small-scale and large-scale businesspeople. Results from both matrices are shown in one
table because the results highlight the importance of direction of data.

TABLE 4 HERE
Second to first tier:
The mean centrality measure in payments directed from second to first tier depositors was
2.8 per cent. Ten first tier depositors had centrality measures above 2.8 per cent. Seven
second tier depositors made no payments to those in the first tier.
There were 279 transactions in this network analysis. The mean number of
transactions per depositor was 7.8. The top ten depositors in this analysis all received
more than 7.8 payments.
At first glance, Campbell Junior dominates this analysis because he received 38
per cent of all payments. Second and third, Williams and Oxley, had much lower
centrality measures of 7.9 per cent and 6.4 per cent respectively. However, in examining
the number of depositors who made payments (as opposed to total number of payments
made), Campbell only received payments from 37 per cent of depositors in this network,

50
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payments were for.
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as opposed to Williams who received payments from 53 per cent of depositors. So, while
Williams received much smaller numbers of individual payments, he had links to more
depositors than Campbell. In addition, the payments Campbell received included 89 from
Robinson, which might indicate a contractual or on-going relationship between them.
Williams, thus, might have had access to more information than Campbell,
particularly if his contacts were influential. Not all contacts have the same value: a small
number of transactions with an important contact might lead to access to better resources
than a large volume of transactions with others.51 Williams’ contacts included a judge of
the Supreme Court (Field), a 46th Regiment Army captain (Gill) and a superintendent of
police (Minchin). Therefore it can be misleading to rely on the centrality measure alone
in a transaction network analysis.
First to second tier
The mean centrality measure in transactions directed from first to second tier depositors
was 5.26 per cent. Six depositors had centrality measures higher than 5.26 per cent. There
were 217 transactions in this network analysis. The mean number of transactions per
depositor was 11.4; the top six depositors all had total transactions greater than 11.4.
Wood dominates with centrality of 20 per cent. However, as in the previous
analysis, when examining the number of depositors who made payments (as opposed to
the total number of payments made to him), Wood received payments from only 22 per
cent of depositors, compared with Smith (31 per cent), Robinson and Sindrey (28 per
cent) and Black (25 per cent). Barnard also received payments from 22 per cent of
depositors. Wood received 20 of his 43 payments from Wentworth (superintendent of
police), indicating some sort of on-going relationship.
51
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Campbell Junior made the most payments (39, or 18 per cent) to those in the
second tier. He also made the most payments in the first tier network analysis (245 or
almost 18 per cent), although he was only second most central. These results, coupled
with his centrality in the second to first tier network analysis, demonstrate the wide nature
of his business connections.52
The results in Table 4 show that more payments (279) were made by second tier
depositors to the first tier than the reverse (217), so that first tier depositors were more
important to the second tier than second tier depositors were to the first tier. For example,
more than a third (37 per cent) of second tier depositors made payments to Campbell
Junior, and more than half (53 per cent) second tier depositors directed payments to
Williams.
It did not necessarily follow that, because the first tier network was the largest
network, the first-to-second tier network would also be larger than the second-to-first-tier
network. The result depended entirely on how many first tier members made payments to
the second tier. First tier depositors would have less reliance on second tier or lower-scale
businesspeople given that they were more successful and operated on a larger-scale. The
findings in Table 4 indicate that this assumption may have been correct.
Some second tier depositors in the second-to-first tier network analysis ended up
with higher centrality measures in the first-to-second tier analysis than in the second tier
analysis (Table 2). This can in part be explained by the higher number of transactions in
the first-to-second tier analysis than in Table 2. However, even the fact that it was a
larger network indicates that there were stronger relationships between first and second
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tier depositors than among second tier depositors. Some second tier members would have
been able to use their ties with first tier members to access resources.
The Most Important Depositors
Using the centrality measures from Tables 2, 3 and 4, the five most important depositors
in each network are ranked in Table 5, in descending order of importance. Note that some
depositors have equal standing.

TABLE 5 HERE
The final column, overall ranking, shows the six most central depositors arising from the
network analysis. Campbell Junior tops the list. He is the most prominent individual in
the network analysis, spreading his payments equally between first and second tier
members. Hence the results here reinforce the far-reaching nature of his business
network, and thus, his importance as a colonial businessman.53
Robinson, emancipist, poet and public servant, was transported twice and is well
documented, although not as a businessman.54 He was one of the original shareholders in
the BNSW and had a balance in his deposit account of £356.10.9 as at December 1821.
This suggests he continued his business activities after the first ledger closed.
Williams had the second largest number of transactions (915) in the ledger. Given
his position in business, it is curious that he has received little attention in the historical
literature.
Comparisons between the sixteen most important depositors are shown in Table 6:
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TABLE 6 HERE

Of the sixteen depositors, eight (Wood, Smith, Williams, Barnard, Black, Sindrey, Amos
and Laycock) we know very little about. The bank balances at 31 December 1821 show
that while some depositors continued their operations into the second ledger, others either
stalled (such as Wood) or discontinued their bank accounts. Barnard, Black, Willmot,
Sindrey and Laycock were not bank shareholders up to 31 December 1821.
Surprisingly, given the results of the network analyses, Campbell Junior and
Williams did not have active bank accounts at 30 December 1821. This might be due, in
part, to the deficiency of £12,100 discovered in the BNSW’s books at the end of 1820;
cashier Francis Williams had made irregular loans to a number of people who could not
meet their bills of exchange when due, including Campbell Junior and Williams.55
Perhaps the latter struggled to repay the loans and no savings were possible.
Nevertheless, Campbell Junior survived and became a director and later president of the
BNSW (director, 1830-51; president, 1843-1851).56 Archival information indicates
Williams continued to be a successful merchant and a publican, was one of the founders
of the Lachlan and Waterloo Mill Company in 182157 and a shareholder in the BNSW in
1826.58 The results perhaps reflect the volatile and uncertain nature of colonial business.
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Limitations and Further Research
The main limitation of this study is that sterling money was not the only medium of
exchange in the colony during this period, and not all colonial businesspeople used the
bank facilities, preferring to use merchants’ credit facilities or barter. Therefore the
transactions of the BNSW provide an incomplete picture. However, this limitation would
apply to most, if not all, studies of colonial business during this period.
Network analysis techniques have a number of limitations, chiefly their inability
to explain whether the same ties will exist over time. Most network results are
‘snapshots’; whereas networks change, as do populations chosen for network analysis,
and relationships among members of networks.59 Nevertheless, the network analysis
provides information that has not previously been available on actual business
transactions among colonial businesspeople, and it deals with a specific and neglected
phase of history.
Further research on business networks covering later time periods, such as the mid
nineteenth century, would be valuable to see how far and in what ways they changed. In
particular, it would be useful to analyse whether they remained an important mechanism
for mitigating uncertainty, given institutional changes such as the growth of export
markets and public corporations made trade more regular and less risky.

Conclusion
The early colonial business community of Sydney faced many forms of uncertainty,
which threatened the continued existence of the small firms that proliferated. We have
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described the principal sources of uncertainty, particularly limited sources of credit, small
markets, and inadequate and belated commercial information. All of these challenges
occurred in a new and little understood environment of a recently established penal
colony, distant from the main international centres of economic and business activity.
Prior research has reported the internal strategies and structures designed to mitigate
uncertainty, such as vertical integration and diversification by product or function.
However, most firms remained small with few internal strategy options. What mattered
most for them was the strength of their relationships with other traders. As such, business
networks based upon regular transacting helped to build trust between firms. Trust
addressed uncertainty in that it reduced the transaction costs of doing business,
encouraged the sharing of information and knowledge, and facilitated the offering of
trade credit. Prior research has also shown the existence of networks within particular
societal groups, for example emancipists.
The current study shows that networks were also established more broadly across
the business community, between emancipists and free settlers, for example, and between
large and small traders, thus overcoming some of the constraints imposed by social
groupings. As Granovetter (1973) classically observed, a web of weak ties spread across
a community of different groupings can yield strong networking benefits. The BNSW
was one of the key institutions of the contemporary financial system whose earliest
records confirm this extensive web of transactions across the business community. Such
transactions, which generally require a degree of trust in the first place, are indicative of
the social capital already established among these businesses. The ongoing nature of such
transactions is suggestive that they in turn further strengthened such links.
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The study also adds to our knowledge of many of the key players in the
embryonic business community, some previously identified but others unknown prior to
this paper, and the nature of their business activities. In particular, some smaller-scale
businesspeople have been shown to have played an important role in colonial business.
The study thus enables a better understanding of the nature of commerce in early NSW.
It adds to our understanding more broadly of Australia’s social history. Holder comments
in the preface to his book on the history of the BNSW, that the colony’s commercial
community were people ‘in relation to each other and to the society in which they were
part’, and that this human aspect of commerce should not be forgotten.60
Finally, the study extends the use of social network analysis as a valuable
methodology in accounting, economic and business history research. The bank records,
reflecting commercial business practices of the time, also add a new dimension.
Accounting data present well for network analysis because of the ability to use directed,
valued ties and the generally readily available data in many company and financial
databases. While this research has only involved a small amount of data, it demonstrates
what can be achieved using network analysis techniques. The fact that so much detail can
be disclosed from simple transaction data illustrates the usefulness of social network
analysis as a research tool.
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Table 1
First and Second Tier Depositors (listed alphabetically)

First Tier

Occupation

Second Tier

Occupation

Antill, H. C.
Berry & Wollstonecraft
Bigge, J.

Governor’s aide
Merchants
UK Govt. Commissioner

Amos, T.S.
Barnard, G.W.
Black, J.H.

Brooks, R.
Broughton, W.

Mariner & merchant
Commissary

Bostock & McQ
Chipendall, W.

Browne, W.
Campbell, J. T.
Campbell, R. Junior

Merchant, farmer
Governor’s secretary
Merchant

Emmett, W.

Chisholm, J.
Clark, J.
Cox, W.

Merchant, ex 102 Regt.
Ship’s captain
Ex Paymaster NSW Corps,
builder & surveyor
Farmer, merchant
Lawyer, merchant
Crown solicitor
Banker, landholder
Auctioneer, dealer
Merchant
Merchant partnership
Merchant
Merchant
Merchant
Merchant, banker
Clerk to Judge-Advocate
Surveyor-general, explorer
Naval Officer
Doctor
Merchant
Merchant
Merchant
Shipbuilder, merchant
Merchant
Superintendent of Police
Merchant
Merchant, landholder
Merchant, ship-owner
Shopkeeper & trader

Solicitor
Ship-owner
Dealer, Accountant,
BNSW
Merchant partnership
Publican, free
settler
Merchant, shipowner
Judge of Supreme
Court
Capt., 46th Regt.
Ship’s captain
Builder
Farmer
Ex-NSW Corps,
Supt. Police
Merchant
Public servant
Merchant, ship’s captain
Builder
Unknown
Publican
Farmer/trader

De Mestre, P.
Eagar, E.
Garling, F.
Hall, E. S.
Hankinson, J.
Jenkins, R.
Jones & Riley
Leverton, W.
Levey, S.
McQueen, J.
McVitie, T.
Moore, J.J.
Oxley, J.
Piper, J.
Redfern, W.
Reibey, M.
Riley, E.
Terry, S.
Underwood, J.
Walker, W.
Wentworth, D’A.
Williams, G.
Wilshire, J.
Winder, T.
Wyatt, J.

Field, B.
Gill, J.
Howard, J.
Kitchen, H.
Laycock, S.
Minchin, W.
Reibey, G.
Robinson, M.
Sindrey, E.
Smith, J.
Watts, J.
Willmot, J.
Wood, J.

Note: Sources, mostly archival documents from the Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales,
are included in the reference list because the list is too long to include here.
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Table 2: Centrality Measure Results for First Tier
Depositor

Williams
Campbell
Junior
Jones &
Riley
Piper
Jenkins
Terry
McVitie
McQueen
Browne
Eagar
Riley
Underwood
Levey
Wilshire
De Mestre
Moore
Walker
Winder
Total Ties

Total
Directed
Ties
174
126

Centrality
%
12.7
9.2

90

Depositor

Centrality
%

Oxley
Hall

Total
Directed
Ties
29
24

6.6

Brooks

19

1.4

76
72
66
56
55
51
51
51
50

5.6
5.3
4.8
4.1
4.0
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.7

17
16
13
14
14
14
13
13
12

1.2
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9

40
36
34
34
31
32

2.9
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.3
2.3

Hankinson
Wentworth
Antill
Broughton
Campbell, J.T.
Chisholm
Cox
Leverton
Berry &
Wollstonecraft
Garling
Redfern
Wyatt
Reibey, M.
Bigge
Clark

12
8
8
7
4
4
1,366

0.9
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.3
100.0

2.1
1.8

Source: First tier network analysis matrix.
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Table 3: Centrality Measure Results for Second Tier
Depositor

Robinson
Smith
Barnard
Wood
Black
Willmot
Amos
Laycock
Sindrey
Bostock &
McQueen
Howard
Chippendall
Emmett
Gill
Reibey, G.
Field
Kitchen
Minchin
Watts
Total Ties

Total
Directed
Ties
10
10
8
8
6
6
5
5
4
3

Centrality
%

3
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
73

4.1
2.7
1.4
1.4
1.4
0
0
0
0
100.0

13.7
13.7
11
11
8.2
8.2
6.8
6.8
5.5
4.1

Source: Second tier network analysis matrix.
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Table 4: Centrality Measure Results for Transactions from Second Tier to First
Tier and First Tier to Second Tier
Direction: Second Tier to First Tier
Depositor
Campbell Jnr.
Williams
Oxley
Jones & Riley
Underwood
Piper
Browne
De Mestre
Riley, E.
Walker
Eagar
Jenkins
Moore
Brooks
Chisholm
Levey
Hankinson
McQueen
Hall
McVitie
Wentworth
Clark
Garling
Antill
Berry
&
Wollstonecraft
Cox
Terry
Wilshire
Winder
Bigge
Broughton
Campbell, J.T.
Leverton
Redfern
Reibey, M.
Wyatt
Total Ties

Total
Directed Ties
106
22
18
13
11
10

Centrality %

9
8
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
1

3.2
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.4
1.4
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.7
0.7
0.4
0.4

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
279

0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

38.0
7.9
6.4
4.6
3.9
3.6

Direction: First Tier to Second Tier
Depositor
Wood
Smith
Robinson
Black
Sindrey
Bostock
&
McQueen
Amos
Barnard
Minchin
Emmett
Reibey, G.
Howard
Chippendall
Field
Laycock
Watts
Kitchen
Gill
Willmot

Total Ties

Total
Directed Ties
43
27
26
20
16
13

Centrality %

11
10
10
9
9
5
4
4
4
3
2
1
0

5.1
4.6
4.6
4.1
4.1
2.3
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.4
0.9
0.5
0.0

217

100.0

20.0
12.4
12.0
9.2
7.4
6.0

Source: First-to-second and second-to-first tier network analysis matrices.
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Table 5: Most Important Depositors

Campbell
Junior
Williams

38.0
7.9

Smith

12.4

Overall
Ranking
all Tables
Campbell
Junior
Wood

11

Oxley

6.4

Robinson

12.0

Robinson

13.7

Wood

11

4.6

Black

9.2

Smith

13.7

Black
Willmot
Amos
Laycock
Sindrey

8.2
8.2
6.8
6.8
5.5

Jones
&
Riley
Underwood

3.9

Sindrey

7.4

Williams
Barnard

12.7
11.0

Centrality
%

Second Tier

Centrality
%

Williams

12.7

Robinson

13.7

Campbell
Junior
Jones
&
Riley
Piper

9.2

Smith

13.7

6.6

Barnard

5.6

Jenkins

5.3

Second to
First Tier

Centrality
%

Centrality
%

Centrality
%

First to
Second
Tier
Wood

First Tier

20.0

38.0
20.0

Source: Tables, 2, 3 and 4.
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Table 6: Comparisons: Most Important Depositors
Account
Balance
30.6.1820
£.s.d.
4.4.9

Account
Balance
30.12.1821
£.s.d.
Nil

No
Yes

0.15.3
335.15.6

0.15.3
356.10.9

Smith
Williams
Barnard
Black
Willmot
Sindrey
Amos
Laycock
Piper

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes

Nil
8.8.3
254.12.0
2.2.7
202.14.8
1,138.3.10
Nil
67.11.8
805.10.7

Nil
Nil
191.15.6
4.8.4
1.10.8
985.3.8
Nil
50.1.7
178.1.9

Jenkins

Yes

307.12.5

858.13.8

Oxley

Yes

8.7.4

146.9.4

Underwood

Yes

772.12.2

220.15.2

Depositor

Campbell
Junior
Wood
Robinson

Public Record
(Australian
Dictionary of
Biography)
Yes

Shareholder

Yes, 1st & 2nd
ledgers
No
Yes, 1st & 2nd
ledgers
Yes, 1st ledger
Yes, 1st ledger
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes, 1st & 2nd
ledgers
Yes, 1st & 2nd
ledgers
Yes, 1st and 2nd
ledgers
Yes, 1st and 2nd
ledgers

*Note that Jones & Riley have been excluded because the firm had become a new partnership (Jones, Riley
and Walker) by 1820 and they had ceased to use a BNSW deposit account.

Sources: Pike, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vols. 1 and 2; BNSW ledger, 31
December 1817, Folios 101-3, 30 June 1818, Folios 105-8, 31 December 1818, Folios
301-4, 30 June 1819, Folios 401-5, 31 December 1819, Folios 407-11, 30 June 1820,
Folios 413-8, Westpac Banking Corporation; Bonwick Transcripts, Box 27, pp. 6292-8,
30 December 1821, ML.
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Figure 1:

First tier cohesive network showing five-node graph where 10
dyads are directly connected.
Williams

Jenkins

Campbell Jnr

Eagar

Jones & Riley

Sources: Table 2 and first tier network analysis matrix.
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